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Abstract 
We evaluate a randomized experiment of a statistical support system developed to assist case-
workers in Swiss employment offices in choosing appropriate active labour market programmes for 
their unemployed clients. This statistical support system predicted the labour market outcome for 
each programme and thereby suggested an 'optimal' labour market programme for each unemployed 
person. The support system was piloted in several employment offices. In those pilot offices, half of 
the caseworkers used the system and the other half acted as control group. The allocation of the 
caseworkers to treatment and control group was random. The experiment was designed such that 
caseworkers retained full discretion about the choice of active labour market programmes, and the 
evaluation results showed that caseworkers largely ignored the statistical support system. This 
indicates that stronger incentives are needed for caseworkers to comply with statistical profiling and 
targeting systems. 
Keywords 





1  Introduction 
Profiling and Targeting Systems received considerable attention in recent years, both from aca 
demic researchers as well as from policy makers. These are statistical systems suggesting who 
should receive certain public services, who should be offered re employment bonuses (O’Leary, 
Decker, and Wandner, 2005), who should attend certain active labour market programmes,
1 who 
should be searched at the airport to maximize Airport Security (Persico and Todd, 2005, Manski 
2006), or which treatment (punishment) should be given to certain criminal offenders, to name just 
a few examples.
2 Particularly in the area of provision of public services such systems are consid 
ered as a potential means to target services more directly to clients in need or to those who would 
benefit most from it. The increasing use of such profiling and targeting systems is made possible 
through the widespread availability of PCs connected to the Intra  or Internet in most government 
offices. These make the online provision of individual impact predictions possible as a potential 
means to target services more precisely to clients who benefit most from them.  
The interest in the targeting of active labour market programmes (ALMP) has been triggered by a 
number of previous disappointing evaluation results. ALMP have been introduced in many coun 
tries during the 1990s to combat the problems of high and persistent unemployment or low earn 
ings of disadvantaged groups. The initial enthusiasm for this paradigm waned when many evalua 
tion studies (in various European countries) concluded with finding rather moderate or even nega 
tive treatment effects. This emphasized the need for targeting ALMP to those unemployed persons 
who may actually benefit from them. Such profiling and targeting systems are, or have been, in 
use in Australia, South Korea, the Netherlands, and the USA. Several other countries like the UK, 
                                                           
1   See the book "Targeting Employment Services" (Eberts, O’Leary and Wandner, 2002) and the articles therein, 
Berger, Black, and Smith (2001), Black, Smith, Plesca, and Plourde (2002), Bryson and Kasparova (2003), Dehejia 
(2005), Eberts (2002), Fraser (2000), Keum (2001), Manski (2000, 2004, 2007), Moisala, Suoniemi, and Uusitalo 
(2006),  Plesca  and  Smith  (2005),  Rudolph  and  Müntnich  (2001),  Staghøj,  Svarer,  and  Rosholm  (2007),  and 
Stephan, Rässler, and Schewe (2006). 
2   Further examples from biometrics include the choice among various medical drugs for cancer treatment (or its 
dosage) or the choice of a rehabilitation therapy for alcohol related problems. Past sickness history and intermediate 
outcomes are used to adjust a time varying dosage. For references on targeting of treatments in biometrics and re 
lated fields, see Brownell and Wadden (1991) on obesity, Velicer and Prochaska (1999) on smoking, Murphy 
(2003) and Murphy, Lynch, Oslin, McKay and TenHave (2007) on drug and alcohol dependence, and Rush (2005) 
on depression.   1 
Germany, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are currently piloting such systems or consider their 
use. Caseworkers seem to have been hostile to such systems in every case, though. It is one of the 
purposes of this paper to add practical knowledge useful for the design of such systems. 
Profiling and targeting systems generally serve two purposes: First, they provide information to 
the caseworker. Econometric impact estimates of expected programme benefits can be provided on 
a relatively disaggregated level. For example, the system can provide individual estimates, for a 
particular client i, of the benefit from taking part in labour market programme A instead of B or C. 
Their second purpose is to solve an agency problem in a decentralized bureaucracy: Caseworkers 
may pursue their own strategies or aim to satisfy their own beliefs or convictions, which may not 
be fully aligned with those intended by the law or the central government. For example, the Swiss 
federal law contains relatively detailed provisions when to use certain sanctions if the unemployed 
person displays insufficient job search efforts. However, the actual implementation of this sanc 
tioning policy differs substantially between caseworkers and between employment offices (Lalive, 
van Ours, and Zweimüller, 2005, Egger and Lenz, 2006, Frölich et al., 2007). Similarly, regarding 
the choice of active labour market programmes, caseworkers are often much less concerned about 
programme costs than taxpayers are, and they may have different aims than increasing rapid rein 
tegration rates as intended by the law, e.g. place more emphasis on sustainable reintegration. 
Profiling and Targeting Systems can be implemented in several ways, with the amount of discre 
tion left to the caseworkers being a crucial parameter. In the one extreme, caseworkers have no 
discretion and the statistical system determines which actions are to be taken for a particular client. 
In the other extreme, the statistical system may simply act as an information tool leaving the 
choice entirely at the caseworker’s discretion. Restricting caseworkers' discretion, as done for ex 
ample in the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services Initiative (WPRS) in the USA (Eberts, 
O’Leary and Wandner, 2002), has the advantage of streamlining service provision and ensuring 
equal treatment of clients across sites. It will lead to an alignment of procedures and actions across 
offices and caseworkers and thereby reduce the heterogeneity in the way the law is implemented. 
It may also save on caseworker’s time, e.g. when clients try to "negotiate" with their caseworker to 
receive or avoid certain services or measures. On the other hand, it may severely reduce job satis 
faction and curtail intrinsic motivation of caseworkers who see themselves as subordinates of a 
computer. This point strongly supports a high degree of caseworker discretion, where the statisti 
cal system acts to assist the caseworkers by providing additional information and suggestions for 
possible actions. Another important advantage of caseworker discretion is its flexibility in permit   2 
ting private information of caseworkers to enter the choice of services. Caseworkers may have 
obtained detailed observations of a client's motivation, personality, work ethos, which could in 
principle also be made available to the statistical system but presumably only with considerable 
measurement error. If such private information is available, it is desirable that caseworkers can 
deviate from the recommendations of the statistical system. In this paper, we find evidence that an 
implementation with full caseworker discretion is not likely to work well. Without strong incen 
tives or coercion, caseworkers may ignore or sabotage a system that is intended to provide infor 
mation only. 
A large randomized field experiment was conducted in 2005 in several employment offices in 
Switzerland, where part of the caseworkers had access to a statistical system providing individual 
predictions of unemployment risk in relation to participation in different programmes of the Swiss 
active labour market policy. The field study was motivated by previous work of Frölich, Lechner, 
and Steiger (2003), and Lechner and Smith (2007) who found indications for substantial potential 
benefits  of  introducing  such  a  statistical  system  in  Switzerland.
3  During  the  randomized  field 
study,  the  behaviour  of  those  caseworkers  who  had  access  to  the  system  and  their  treatment 
choices were monitored and compared to a randomized control group. The evaluation results show 
that caseworkers did not change their behaviour in any significant way due to having access to the 
additional information. Caseworkers either decided to ignore the system or were over confident in 
that their own experience clearly dominates any information that a statistical system might pro 
vide. 
Hence, there is a dilemma if one intends to use profiling and targeting to solve the agency problem 
in a decentralized bureaucracy: When providing no incentives to use the system, caseworkers may 
ignore or sabotage it. However, severely restricting caseworkers' discretion crowds out intrinsic 
motivation and does not exploit the value of the private information of the caseworker. (Even the 
fear that the system could potentially be used to restrict caseworker discretion could already raise 
strong objections on the side of the caseworkers, as was the case with SOMS in Canada, which 
had to be stopped even before it was fully operational, Colpitts, 2002.) Our findings clearly sug 
gest that permitting full caseworker discretion is unlikely to work. If the use of a statistical system 
                                                           
3   Both studies found indications for treatment effect heterogeneity regarding employment chances that caseworkers 
did not exploit. Caseworkers did not appear to be more successful in selecting labour market programmes than a 
purely random allocation.   3 
is intended, either restrictions of caseworker discretion, or positive rewards for complying with the 
statistical system (i.e. for voluntarily restricting discretion) are needed. 
In the next section, we describe profiling and targeting systems for unemployed and some of their 
implementations. Section 3 explains the particular implementation of the Swiss targeting system. 
Section 4 gives the detailed results of the experimental evaluation of the Swiss system and Section 
5 concludes. Four appendices provide further details concerning the data, the econometrics used 
for the predictions, the Swiss active labour market policy, and the results of the experimental 
evaluation. 
2  Profiling and targeting systems 
2.1  Optimal programme choice 
In a series of recent papers, Manski (2000, 2004, 2007) considered the choice between different 
treatments from the perspective of a social planner. A number of mutually exclusive treatments is 
available and the social planner attempts to choose the optimal treatment for each client.
4 The 
treatments may be different medical drugs, different therapies for persons with alcohol related 
problems, or different active labour market programmes (ALMP) to mention just a few examples. 
The ALMP available often comprise job search training, personality courses, language courses, 
computer courses, vocational skills training, further training, employment programmes etc. 
At some time t the individual i may receive one of R+1 different treatment options and we observe 
an outcome at the time (or during the period until) t+τ. Let 
0 1
, , , , ,...,
R
i t i t i t Y Y Y τ τ τ + + +  
be the potential outcomes for individual i, i.e. those outcomes that would be observed if a particu 
lar treatment is chosen. The treatment 0 usually refers to the choice of "no active treatment", e.g. 
no medical drug or no labour market programme. (In our application, we consider repeated treat 
ment choices, where a choice is made at every counselling meeting. Treatment 0 then means "no 
programme is chosen now" but perhaps at the next counselling meeting.) 
                                                           
4   We examine here only the choice of programmes as one of the instruments of active labour market policy. Wunsch 
(2007) considers the design of an optimal unemployment insurance system as a whole where also other instruments 
are included.   4 
If the treatment choice cannot, or should not, be delegated to the individual, e.g. because of the 
moral hazard problem inherent in the unemployment insurance system, the social planner can only 
allocate programmes on the basis of observed characteristics, which we denote by Xit. Under cer 
tain conditions (absence of risk aversion on the planner’s side or a binary outcome variable,
5 ab 
sence of supply side constraints, absence of externalities), the optimal choice for a client with 
characteristics Xit is given by 
*
{0,..., }




r X E Y X X
∈
= =  
and is thus based on estimates of the expected conditional potential outcomes 
0
, , [ | ],..., [ | ]
R
i t it i t it E Y X E Y X τ τ + + . 
This is the basis for statistical targeting systems, which select for each client the programme with 
the highest expected outcome. 
This is in contrast to profiling systems, which predict only the outcome
0
, [ | ] i t it E Y X τ +  i.e. when "no 
active treatment" is chosen. In the particular application to active labour market programmes, the 
profiling systems often estimate the risk of becoming long-term unemployed if not taking part in 
ALMP. Unemployed persons assessed to be at high risk are then assigned to the most intensive 
services. As discussed e.g. in Frölich, Lechner, and Steiger (2003), targeting is preferable to profil 
ing if a variety of heterogeneous labour market programmes are offered, as it is often the case in 
European countries, and if the long term unemployment risk is not highly correlated with pro 
gramme impacts, as it was found e.g. in Berger, Black, and Smith (2001). 
In practice, the social planner will not be omnipresent and needs agents, i.e. the caseworkers in the 
employment offices, to implement the intended policies. In addition to providing psychological 
support, they should choose labour market programmes to maximize the objectives of the central 
planner.
6 This can lead to deviations from the idealized situation described above. First, they have 
to estimate the unknown potential employment outcomes for each programme and each particular 
client. These estimates need to be updated at a regular interval since the characteristics Xit , such as 
                                                           
5   When the outcome variable is binary, the conditional mean characterizes the entire conditional distribution. 
6   This is in addition to choosing the right degree of monitoring and sanctioning, providing information on vacancies 
and maintaining employer contacts etc., which was not part of the field experiment due to lack of consistent data.   5 
the unemployment duration and employability, change over time, which may effect the optimal 
treatment choice. Caseworkers will usually attempt to predict programme impacts by combining 
results from past national or regional evaluation studies (which will usually be very aggregated, 
e.g. for men versus women, young versus old) with their own observations of the careers of their 
clients, complemented by discussions with their colleagues and supervisors. For producing these 
predictions, they face the problem of a relatively small sample size that is available to them, i.e. 
the number of clients they have personally counselled. This is particularly acute for caseworkers 
with little job experience.
7 
Furthermore, the caseworkers' capacity to follow up on their clients after they are de registered 
from the employment office is also rather limited. For some unemployed, the exit state is known, 
e.g. to employment or out of labour force. For other persons it is only known that they did not 
show up at the employment office anymore. The subsequent career of the previously unemployed 
person is usually unknown to the caseworker. (If the person becomes unemployed again, he might 
be allocated to a different caseworker or might be registered in a different employment office.) It 
is worthwhile mentioning that for successful treatment choice, precise estimation of the differences 
in employment probabilities between the various programmes is important, not the levels in them 
selves. Bell and Orr (2002) found that caseworkers did not systematically select those into treat 
ment who would benefit most from it, and Frölich, Lechner and Steiger (2003) and Lechner and 
Smith (2007) found similarly that the treatment effect heterogeneity was not successfully taken 
account of by caseworkers. 
A statistical system may thus be helpful to provide estimates of the expected potential outcomes 
on an individual basis, if a detailed administrative database of past service provision and treatment 
choices is available. The database will often be nationwide, covering the entire population with 
detailed individual data and complete follow up information. An individual who moved to a dif 
ferent locality may be out of sight for the previous caseworker but subsequent unemployment 
spells will be recorded in the data set available to the statistical system. The large sample size and 
the complete follow up information can thus lead to impact estimates that contain additional in-
formation for the caseworkers. If made available to them, caseworkers may then combine this in 
                                                           
7   Many caseworkers receive intensive training organized by the federal unemployment system, where they also learn 
about the effectiveness of certain active labour market programmes. This training, however, will impart only more 
or less general impact estimates for broad demographic groups, e.g. young women in a certain industry and cannot 
be case specific, where one would like to account for a large number of case specific characteristics.   6 
formation with their own expectations of programme impacts, where they can incorporate addi 
tional private information about their subjective assessment of the motivation, personality, and 
work ethos of the unemployed client.  
Statistical Profiling and Targeting Systems may often also have another purpose than merely pro 
viding information. They may help to streamline service provision and ensure that caseworkers 
aim at the same target variables as the central planner does. Thereby, the statistical system may 
help to solve the agency problem in a decentralized bureaucracy. Caseworkers often have consid 
erable discretion in the actions they take (or ignore to take). As one example, the sanctioning of 
unemployed persons was mentioned in the introduction. Also in other respects, the caseworkers 
and employment offices may well pursue their own convictions of what constitutes the best atti 
tude towards unemployed. Some caseworkers pursue rapid re employment, whereas others grant 
the unemployed more time to find good job matches. Some caseworkers expect active labour mar 
ket programmes to be beneficial for immediate employment, whereas others use them also to pro 
vide  psychological  stabilization  and  develop  ‘fitness  for  the  labour  market’  (Egger  and  Lenz, 
2006, Frölich et. al., 2007). In addition, a sympathetic or antipathetic relationship to the unem 
ployed  person  may  also  unconsciously  influence  the  actions  taken.  Furthermore,  caseworkers 
probably are less concerned about programme costs than taxpayers would be. The central govern 
ment provides certain indicators it seeks to pursue but leaves the employment offices almost com 
plete freedom in their implementation (Egger and Lenz, 2006, Frölich et. al., 2007). The statistical 
targeting system, on the other hand, aims at a clearly defined targeting indicator, usually employ 
ment (or unemployment) at a certain point in time or over a certain period. 
A distinguishing feature of different profiling and targeting systems is thus the amount of case 
worker discretion permitted. If the streamlining of service provision were an important aspect, one 
would expect less caseworker discretion. On the other hand, this may reduce the caseworkers’ in 
trinsic work motivation and job satisfaction and their flexibility to use private information about 
clients to obtain better treatment choices. Some countries have implemented such systems for the 
provision of active labour market programmes or welfare to work services (Australia, Canada, 
South Korea, Netherlands, USA) and several European countries are planning to implement it in 
the near future (UK, Germany, Denmark, Finland and Sweden).
8 They differ in the degree of dis 
                                                           
8   Germany is currently piloting a targeting system, see Stephan, Rässler, and Schewe (2006). Sweden is currently 
piloting a profiling system in one county and is considering a targeting system as well. (Personal communication by   7 
cretion that caseworkers retain, but caseworkers seem to have been hostile to such systems in 
every case. 
2.2  Experiences with targeting systems in Canada and the USA 
Canada developed the Service and Outcome Measurement System (SOMS) between 1994 and 
1999 as a support system for service delivery staff who retained full discretionary power (Colpitts 
2002). SOMS was based on a set of parametric statistical models of subgroup employment ser 
vices impacts estimated on a huge database constructed by merging a number of different adminis 
trative datasets. SOMS, however, was never implemented mainly because of data security con 
cerns and because of resistance from frontline caseworkers who perceived SOMS as a threat to 
their own job security. Staff fears were fanned by an impending organizational restructuring within 
the ministry for human resources and employment. The SOMS database was deleted in 2002, be 
fore SOMS ever was tried in the field.  
The Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system was implemented nationwide 
in the USA in 1994 and has operated in all states since that time. WPRS ranks new UI beneficiar 
ies who are not exempt from UI job search requirements by their probability of UI benefit exhaus 
tion. UI beneficiaries ranked by WPRS are then referred automatically to reemployment services 
in order from highest to lowest probability until the available slots for services are filled. Most 
states rank UI beneficiaries exhaustion probabilities using a logit model of benefit exhaustion 
(Wandner 2002). Evaluations have produced a range of impact estimates for WPRS. Dickinson, 
Decker, and Kreutzer (2002) estimated reductions in UI benefit receipt as large as half a week 
based on analysis of state administrative data. Black, Smith, Berger, and Noel (2003) estimated a 
reduction of 2.2 weeks in benefit duration based on random assignment to WPRS in Kentucky. 
A Frontline Decision Support System (FDSS) was developed for the state of Georgia in the USA. 
It was planned as a decision support system for frontline staff in one stop employment service 
centres to target reemployment services. The FDSS included two main parts: the systematic job 
search module, and the service referral module. The service referral module identifies the se 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Anders Forslund, IFAU, Uppsala.) Finland has piloted a profiling system and is about to implement it. (Personal 
communication by Roope Uusitalo, Labour Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki; see also Moisala, Suoniemi, 
and Uusitalo, 2006.) Denmark is considering a targeting system, see also Staghøj, Svarer, and Rosholm (2007). The 
UK used profiling in a pilot study for workers on incapacity benefits and is currently rolling out the system. (Per 
sonal communication by Alex Bryson and Richard Dorsett, Policy Studies Institute, London.)   8 
quence of activities that most often lead to successful employment for clients with similar back 
ground characteristics (Eberts and O'Leary 2002). It was pilot tested in two Georgia Career Cen 
ters but discontinued soon after for several reasons, without subsequent impact evaluation.
9  
The Work First Profiling Pilot Project (WFPPP) involved comparison of targeted assignment with 
random assignment of referrals to reemployment services among Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) benefit recipients in Michigan. A net impact evaluation suggested that targeting 
yielded a cost effective improvement in employment success (Eberts 2002). 
In the following section, the evaluation of a pilot study of a targeting system in Switzerland is de 
scribed, where caseworkers retained full discretion in their treatment choices. 
3  The SAPS experiment in Switzerland 
3.1  Background 
Switzerland enjoyed very low unemployment rates during most of the last century until the reces 
sion of the early 1990s when unemployment increased to levels not seen before. This triggered a 
complete revision of the unemployment insurance act in 1996. In concordance with the conven 
tional wisdom of the OECD at that time, Switzerland switched from a passive unemployment 
benefit system towards an active system promoting training and work experience to unemployed 
persons. The federal states (cantons) were forced to provide a minimum number of active labour 
market programme places, and participation was made mandatory for every unemployed person if 
allocated to a programme by the caseworker. Allocation to a programme is at the caseworker's full 
discretion, and non compliance leads to a suspension of benefit payments. 
The initial enthusiasm about ALMP has waned in the recent years since several evaluation studies 
found rather moderate or even negative effects. While some policy actors sympathized with the 
idea of abolishing the (most) expensive measures, the prevailing view was that active labour mar 
ket programmes should remain, but should be better targeted towards those who clearly benefit 
from them.  
                                                           
9   FDSS arrived the same time as a huge rise in UI claims associated with a major recession, a change in mainframe 
computing environment, which bogged down simple administrative tasks for staff, and the transfer from the Geor 
gia agency of the main FDSS champion who was the assistant commissioner for employment services. She left the 
agency to lead the U.S. Department of Labor southern regional office. We thank Chris O'Leary for pointing out   9 
This laid the foundation for the SAPS experiment. The Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Af 
fairs initiated a pilot study on targeting active labour market services in 21 employment offices: 
Caseworkers should be assisted in their treatment choices with statistical information.
10 The idea 
of  the  Statistically  Assisted  Programme  Selection  (SAPS)  was  to  predict  for  each  individual, 
which programme would benefit him or her most. Statistical predictions about the net impact 
should be made for every jobseeker and for every possible labour market programme based on an 
extremely  large  and  rich  database.  These  predictions,  conveyed  to  the  caseworker  through  an 
Internet  application,  would  provide  individual  information  on  how  much  participating  in  that 
course would help to improve employment chances. Such predictions were made biweekly to take 
new information on time varying covariates into account to assist the caseworker in choosing when 
a programme should start. 






















































































































A feasibility study was carried out in 2002 for the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs to ex 
plore the possibilities of a potential pilot study. The State Secretariat thereafter continued with the 
preparations for a pilot study, which was carried out in the field from May/June to December 
2005. The field study took place in five different regions: Basel, Bern, St.Gallen, Zürich, and Ge 
neva, where the results for Geneva should be considered with caution since a separate profiling 
tool was tested in that period and since only two very specialized employment offices participated 
in the SAPS evaluation. (There were also further problems with Geneva as discussed later.) 
Since the pilot project was conducted with the aim to explore the potential for a subsequent large 
scale introduction of the statistical system in Switzerland, an impact evaluation of SAPS was a key 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
many of these details. 
10  A very detailed report (in German) is given in Behncke, Frölich, and Lechner (2007).   10 
element. A randomized evaluation was featured where caseworkers were randomized either into 
the in or the out group. A randomization at the level of the caseworker was preferred to a randomi 
zation at the level of the employment office or at the level of the unemployed person. The number 
of  participating  employment  offices  was  considered  too  small  for  a  reasonable  randomization 
across sites. A randomization at the level of the unemployed person, on the other hand, would 
have led to the problem that a caseworker would receive employment predictions for some of his 
clients but not for others. Such a situation would presumably have reduced compliance and/or 
would also have produced spill over effects: a caseworker receiving predictions for some of his 
clients would try to extrapolate those predictions to his other clients, for whom no predictions were 
provided. 
Therefore, in each pilot office half of the regular caseworkers were randomized in and half out. A 
third group of caseworkers, called the definitive nonparticipants, contains all the caseworkers who 
were not included in the randomization for various reasons.
11 This should also imply a randomiza 
tion on the unit of the jobseekers because at a given point in time, each jobseeker is assigned 
uniquely to one caseworker. Randomization, however, is only implied at the beginning of the field 
study since newly registered jobseekers could have been assigned by the office management in a 
non random way to treatment and control group. We therefore distinguish in the later analyses 
between a stock and a flow sample. The stock sample contains all jobseekers who were already 
registered at the beginning of the field study in the respective employment office. The flow sample 
contains all jobseekers who entered later. Whereas the stock sample should (almost
12) be random 
ized, the assignment process for the flow sample was beyond our control. The employment office 
managers could have changed the allocation between caseworkers and new jobseekers such that 
the more difficult cases were assigned to the treatment group (which had access to the tool) or 
rather to the control group (which did not experience the burden on their time resources by partici 
pating in the field study). The ensuing groups might thus in principle not be randomized. (The 
                                                           
11  Before the randomization was carried out, a number of caseworkers were removed to restrict randomization only to 
the 'regular' caseworkers. Those persons include the management of the employment office, all caseworkers with 
substantive administrative duties, caseworkers that mainly assist only specific groups of unemployed (e.g. disabled, 
youth, unemployed with the intention of self employment), caseworkers that were on sick leave for a longer time or 
about to retire in the next months or were known to leave the employment office soon, and caseworkers, who an 
nounced their unwillingness to participate in the field study before the randomization took place. 
12  There was a time delay of a few weeks between randomization of caseworkers and beginning of the pilot study.   11 
equality of means tests, however, shows that such concerns are not justified.) 
Apart from concerns about randomization, there is also an independent interest to evaluate the 
impact of SAPS predictions for the stock and the flow separately, because they become available 
at different times in the unemployment spell. For the flow sample, the predictions are made right 
from the beginning of the spell, whereas they start for the stock sample at the beginning of the 
experiment, i.e. after they have been unemployed for a while. From this perspective, the analysis 
of the flow sample would be more interesting since a practical implementation of a SAPS system 
should provide predictions as early as possible. Yet, any differences in estimated impacts could 
also be attributable to declining or increasing interest of the caseworkers during the course of the 
field study. 
Table 1: Randomization of caseworkers in the pilot offices 
  Randomization  Dropout during study 
  In  Out  In  Out 
Region Basel: Basel city (3 offices together)  29  29  1  1 
Region Bern:         
  Jura bernois and Bienne a)  16 (15)  13 (11)    2 
  Bern Centre  9  8  1  1 
  Bern West  12  11  1  2 
  Bern Gümlingen  8  8     
  Bern Zollikofen  8  7     
  Bern Betlehem  11 (8)  10 (8)  1   
  Tafers (Fribourg)  4  3     
  Murten (Fribourg)  3  3     
Region Zürich:         
  Lagerstrasse  7  6    1 
  Bülach  9  9  1  1 
Region St.Gallen:         
  Oberuzwil  9  7  1  3 
  Sargans  4  4  2   
Region Geneva: b)         
  Gavard  5  7    2 
  Rive  12  12 (11)  2  2 
Total:  146 (142)  137 (132)  10  15 
Note:   The first two columns give the number of caseworkers randomized in and out. For some of the caseworkers it turned out that they did not counsel any 
unemployed for various reasons. The numbers in brackets provide the number of caseworkers with non-zero clients during the field study. 
The last two columns show dropout of caseworkers during the study due to retirement, prolonged sickness, dismissal, quit, or death. 
a) These are 2 offices plus 3 sub-branches. Randomization was carried out together because some caseworkers were employed at the same time in two 
offices or branches. 
b) The employment office in the canton Geneva are not geographically organized but specialize on occupation and skill groups. The two employment of-
fices Gavard and Rive were specialized on specific occupational groups. 
Note that the randomization was carried out for the caseworkers, but the outcomes of interest for 
the evaluation are the employment prospects of the jobseekers. Table 1 shows the number of case 
workers in the pilot offices. The first two columns give the number of caseworkers randomized in   12 
and out. For some of the caseworkers it turned out that they actually did not counsel any unem 
ployed during the period of the field study, e.g. due to sickness, leave, re organization, or complete 
focus on employer contacts. The numbers in brackets provide the number of caseworkers with 
non zero clients during the field study. (There is still quite some variation between them, with 
some caseworkers counselling only 10 to 20 clients at a given time, whereas the upper limit is 
about 150.) The last two columns show the number of official dropouts of caseworkers during the 
period of the field study. These are caseworkers whose number of clients officially falls to zero 
due to retirement, prolonged sickness, dismissal, quit, or death. (It does not include caseworkers 
who were no longer interested in participation.) These fluctuations are more pronounced in the two 
employment offices of St. Gallen where 25% of the caseworkers left the office during the period 
of the field study. 
3.2  The SAPS estimates and the outcome variable 
During the field study, the participating caseworkers received suggestions for the optimal pro 
gramme for every particular jobseeker via the Internet. The SAPS predictions were made available 
to the caseworkers via an easy to use Internet application. Based on a personalized login, case 
workers had access only to the predictions of their own clients. They were asked to provide feed 
back about these predictions. (Every access to the database was recorded.) The caseworkers of the 
control group had no access to the predictions. For the purpose of later analysis, we also computed 
the employment predictions for their clients, but made them not available. 
The predictions were updated every second week by incorporating new information on time vary 
ing covariates (in particular unemployment duration). This is a big advantage vis à vis simple pro 
filing models as it takes into account that the optimal time when a labour market programme 
should start may also vary across individuals. 
The overriding aim of active labour market policies in Switzerland is rapid, and ideally sustained, 
employment. The outcome variable of most interest was therefore defined as the number of months 
in stable employment in the next 12 months, where an employment spell is considered as ‘stable’ if 
it lasts for at least 3 months. This outcome variable was used for the predictions given by SAPS. 
For reasons of consistency, it is used for the evaluation of effects of SAPS as well.  
The active labour market programmes were grouped into 6 to 8 categories (depending on region). 
See also Appendix B and C. For every individual i with characteristics Xit every second week it   13 
was predicted how many months of stable employment would be expected if that individual started 
a programme of this category now. A further category was the option ‘no programme now, but 
perhaps later’. 
The information conveyed by SAPS to the caseworker consisted of two parts: First, for every pro 
gramme the expected number of months in stable employment was predicted. Second, the statisti 
cal precision of the estimates was also conveyed to the caseworker in that the set of all pro 
grammes was divided into three groups: The significantly best programmes, the intermediate pro 
grammes, and the worst programmes. The set of significantly best programmes contains the true 
programme with a relatively high statistical confidence. This set was estimated by Multiple Com 
parison with the Best (MCB) routines (see Horrace and Schmidt 2000 or Frölich 2008). 
The cardinality of the set of significantly best programmes varies across jobseekers: For some job 
seekers, there was only one programme being statistically significantly better than the rest. For 
other jobseekers, this set contained several programmes or, in some cases, all programmes. It was 
suggested to the caseworkers to choose an option from the set of significantly best programmes 
with a slight preference to be given to the programme with the largest estimate. (This distinction 
will be used later when we consider the compliance of the caseworkers.) Important aspects on the 
econometric methodology are given in Appendix B, with more information to be found in Frölich 
(2008) and the corresponding (more detailed) discussion paper Frölich (2006). 
4  Evaluation of the experiment 
4.1  The field study and the presumed causal chain 
The field study took place from May/June to December 2005. The evaluation of the impact of 
SAPS is based on data from the unemployment insurance system until December 2006. In total, 
employment  predictions  were  made  for  18713  jobseekers  whereas  the  control  pool  contained 
16677 jobseekers in pilot employment offices during this period. In a first instance, we examined 
whether the control and treated jobseekers are similar in their observed characteristics. Therefore, 
we  examined  separately  the  stock  (=  22758  jobseekers)  and  the  flow  sample  (=  12632  job 
seekers).
13 All offices passed the randomization test with the exception of the two offices in Ge 
                                                           
13  As described in the previous section we randomized the caseworkers in each office, not the jobseekers themselves. 
Hence, randomization at the jobseeker level was not fully under our control.   14 
neva. (See Behncke, Frölich, and Lechner 2007 for more details.) It seems that a re allocation of 
caseworkers had taken place in Geneva after our randomization. Therefore, Geneva is treated 
separately in the following. As we will see later, the offices in Geneva also had a very low compli 
ance rate, such that any econometric analysis for these caseworkers would not have been sensible 
anyhow. 
Apart from the distinction between stock and flow sample we also have to consider the possibility 
that a jobseeker’s caseworker may change over time. Apart from random fluctuations e.g. due to 
extended holidays, sickness, quit, dismissal, or retirement of the caseworker, the policy of case 
worker change (Dossierwechsel) is a major reason of this. In many offices, the caseworker is 
changed if the jobseeker stays unemployed for more than 6 or 8 months, with the intention to in 
troduce new ideas in the job search process. This implies that those jobseekers for whom a case 
worker change is observed are more likely to have difficulties in finding a job, which is clearly 
seen in their unemployment histories. In most of the analyses, we will define treatment status of 
the jobseeker as time-invariant according to the randomization status of the first caseworker. More 
precisely, for the stock sample it is the caseworker in charge at the inception of the field study, 
whereas for the flow sample it is the first caseworker observed after the beginning of the study. 
The time invariant definition will implement the intended randomization design as closely as pos 
sible. However, it also implies that some of the controls may actually have later on been influ 
enced by SAPS predictions, whereas for some of the treated, SAPS predictions were no longer 
available. In total, there were 2263 treatment group switchers. In addition to the total sample, we 
will therefore also consider the subsample without switchers, i.e. after deleting all jobseekers for 
whom a change in caseworker between treatment and control group has been observed.
14 For the 
remaining subsample the SAPS predictions were either available during the entire field study or 
never at all. Although the switchers are clearly different in their observed characteristics from the 
non switchers, we do not find any evidence for systematic differences between those who switch 
into treatment versus those who switch into the control group. See also Appendix D.1. 
In evaluating the field study, we follow the hypothesized causal chain of the treatment. Casework 
ers received a one hour introduction into the use of the Internet SAPS system, which in itself is 
unlikely to have affected their counselling style. Thereafter caseworkers were free to download the 
                                                           
14  We do not exclude jobseekers with caseworker changes where both caseworkers belonged to the treatment group or 
both to the control group.   15 
employment predictions for any client at any time, which was recorded by our database. Case 
workers were also asked to provide feedback online, which was also recorded. 
The hypothesized causal chain, which is sketched in the following figure, thus starts with the 
download of the SAPS predictions for a particular client.
15 Caseworkers usually downloaded them 
during or before a counselling meeting. The download of the predictions could have had two ef 
fects: They could have affected the counselling style of the caseworker, who e.g. might have 
shown these predictions directly to the unemployed person. Second, they could have influenced 
the choice of ALMP, perhaps not immediately but within the next few weeks. From the overall 
feedback that we received from the caseworkers, it seems that their counselling style has been only 
very little affected, if at all. Hence, the second channel, i.e. the choice of ALMP, is the channel 
that we consider most relevant here.  
 
  Download of the SAPS predictions  →  Choice of ALMP 
               ↓                       ↓ 
    Counselling style         →  Employment status one year after 
 
Appendix D.2 provides some details on the frequency of downloading SAPS predictions. Overall, 
the SAPS predictions were examined at least once for 37% of all jobseekers in the treatment 
group. Hence, for almost two thirds of the jobseekers the predictions were never viewed and these 
jobseekers could thus hardly have been influenced by the pilot study. In Geneva, the SAPS project 
was almost completely ignored: the SAPS predictions were hardly ever examined at all. Therefore, 
Geneva is omitted in most of the following analyses. 
4.2  The choice of ALMP between treated and control 
Since the main impact of SAPS on employment is expected by changing the allocation of job 
seekers to ALMP, we start with examining the choice of programmes between the treated and the 
control jobseekers. In a second step, in Section 4.3 we will also take into account that the SAPS 
predictions could only have had an effect on those jobseekers for whom predictions had been 
                                                           
15 There may also have been a spill over effect from treated to control caseworkers, for which we do not observe any 
anecdotal evidence.   16 
downloaded. 
One would expect that caseworkers in the treatment group would (at least partly) follow the pre 
dictions after they have become available to them. Whether a caseworker followed or complied 
with the predictions can be defined in various different ways. The simplest definition considers a 
SAPS prediction to have been followed or complied with if the recommended labour market pro 
gramme according to SAPS has subsequently also been assigned to the jobseeker. In fact, below 
we consider a number of different definitions of compliance, which all have in common that we 
examine, for each jobseeker, whether SAPS predictions and actual assignment to labour market 
programmes coincided. We will see that all these different definitions lead to the same conclusion: 
compliance with SAPS was low or inexistent. 
For the following tables it is important to note that although the caseworkers in the control group 
had no access to the SAPS predictions, we nevertheless computed these predictions also for the 
jobseekers of the control group. Thereby we can measure “compliance” also for the control group, 
which is the probability that the hypothetical predictions for the control group coincide with the 
actual choices made for them, without knowing the predictions. Hence, we can examine whether 
caseworkers of the treatment group were more likely to follow the SAPS predictions than those of 
the control group. 
Here, we consider the short-term compliance with the SAPS predictions. In Definition 1, compli 
ance is defined for a jobseeker i if the most recommended programme of the first SAPS prediction 
is identical to the first labour market programme assigned within the following 90 days. If no 
ALMP is assigned within these 90 days, this is considered as “no programme” having been as 
signed. In Definition 2, compliance is defined for a jobseeker i if any of the set of MCB best pro 
grammes is identical to the first labour market programme assigned within the following 90 days. 
Definition 2 thus subsumes Definition 1. 
In principle, it is possible that the 90 days window is too short and caseworkers needed more time 
to implement the SAPS recommendations. Similarly, they might have complied with the SAPS 
predictions but only with the second ALMP they assigned. For example, they might have had an 
other ALMP in mind for that client and sent him to that programme first before implementing the 
SAPS recommendations with a second programme. To permit for such delayed compliance, we 
will also consider alternative definitions in Appendix D.3, which we refer to as long term compli 
ance.   17 
Table 2 gives the respective short term compliance rates for treated and controls. The assigned 
ALMP coincided with the programme with the highest SAPS prediction for only 12% of the job 
seekers. If the wider Definition 2 is used, this rate increases to 29%. Strikingly, these rates are the 
same for the treatment and the control group. Since the control group reflects what would have 
happened in the treatment group if the SAPS predictions were not available, the conclusion is that 
the availability of the SAPS predictions had no impact on the actual choice of ALMP. This con 
clusion holds with and without switchers, for the stock and for the flow sample, and in every re 
gion. For the flow sample, it even appears as if the treated complied less than the controls, but this 
difference is not statistically significant. The results in Appendix D.3 lead to similar conclusions 
for long term compliance. 
Table 2: Short-term compliance of caseworkers in their choice of ALMP 












ment  Control  Treat 
ment  Control  Treat 
ment  Control 
Including switchers  16566  14977  0.12  0.12  0.29  0.29 
Without switchers  15701  14155  0.12  0.12  0.29  0.30 
Stock sample  9844  8862  0.11  0.11  0.29  0.29 
Flow sample  5857  5293  0.13  0.14  0.28  0.30 
Basel  3528  3514  0.20  0.22  0.44  0.45 
Bern  8484  7458  0.10  0.09  0.26  0.26 
Geneva  1843  1437  0.04  0.05  0.14  0.14 
St.Gallen  1578  1250  0.11  0.12  0.24  0.26 
Zürich  2111  1933  0.08  0.07  0.19  0.18 
Note:   Unit of observation is the jobseeker. All rows (except the row labelled Geneva) are without Geneva. All rows (except for the first one) 
are without switchers. Definition 1 refers to the programme with the highest SAPS prediction. Definition 2 refers to all programmes, 
which belong to the MCB set of statistically significantly better programmes. 
These results raise the question why caseworkers did not comply with the SAPS predictions. Two 
possible answers stand out: First, caseworkers make their own predictions and it could have hap 
pened that these largely provided the same recommendations as the SAPS predictions. Second, 
caseworkers may have more or less ignored the econometric predictions either because of confi 
dence in the superiority of their own judgements or because of unwillingness to comply with an 
external tool that could pose a potential threat to their future autonomy and discretion if introduced 
nationwide (perhaps with more binding predictions). The first of these answers can be ruled out as 
the SAPS predictions differed clearly from the choices made by the control caseworkers. The pat   18 
terns  recommended  by  SAPS  and  those  realized  by  the  caseworkers  without  accesses  to  the 
econometric predictions are very different. (See Table D.7 in Appendix D.3.) 
4.3  The impact of downloading the SAPS predictions on ALMP and employment 
Table 2 showed that on average we observe only very little or zero differences between treated and 
control groups in the realized choices regarding programme participation. One reason for this 
could be that caseworkers disregarded the SAPS predictions from the beginning by not even look 
ing at them. Since the SAPS predictions were made available via the Internet, we could monitor at 
what time exactly a caseworker inspected the predictions for a particular jobseeker. In a first in 
stance,  we  examine  how  intensively  caseworkers  have  made  use  of  the  statistical  system  to 
download predictions from the Internet, and whether this depended on characteristics of the case 
workers or the jobseeker. (Details can be found in Appendix D.2.) We observed that 21 of the 
caseworkers (= 15%) never examined the predictions at all, and that for many jobseekers SAPS 
predictions were never downloaded. We can thus partition the treatment group into jobseekers for 
whom predictions were never viewed and for those for whom they were examined at least once. It 
is hard to imagine that SAPS could have had an effect on those jobseekers for whom the predic 
tions were never examined. 
We could thus compare compliance and the choice of ALMP for those for whom SAPS predic 
tions had been viewed versus those for whom they had not been inspected. Because the decision to 
download SAPS predictions is at the discretion of the caseworker and likely to be endogenous, 
such analyses could be affected by selection bias. We therefore perform instrumental variables 
regression of the effect of downloading SAPS predictions on compliance. We define for each job 
seeker whether his SAPS predictions were ever downloaded during the field study. For a jobseeker 
of the control group, naturally, this never happens. It seems safe to assume that a caseworker who 
did not download the predictions is probably unlikely to comply more with the predictions than a 
caseworker of the control group. We can thus use the randomization as an instrument, denoted by 
Z, for the download of the predictions (treatment D) to estimate the impact of seeing the predic 
tions on compliance status Y. This setup is thus very similar to the concept of Imbens and Angrist 
(1994). Since it was impossible for the members of the control group to download the predictions 
the monotonicity condition of Imbens and Angrist (1994) is satisfied by definition, and this also 
means that the local average treatment effect (LATE) is the same as the average treatment effect   19 
on the treated (ATET) because the treated are the compliers.
16 The exclusion restriction is our as 
sumption that unemployed whose caseworker is in the treatment group but not downloading the 
predictions are not affected by their status as being randomized in, compared to unemployed with 
caseworker randomized to the control group. 
Table 3 presents the impact of downloading the predictions on short term compliance according to 
Definitions 1 and 2. We show IV estimates without control variables (i.e. Wald estimates) and 
with several control variables (2SLS), which may produce more precise estimates due to efficiency 
gains. The first stage regression (not shown) is highly significant in both cases (indicating that the 
instrument is not weak). Table 3 shows, however, that all estimates of the effects are insignificant. 
The only exception is a negative effect in the flow sample in Basel. The effects in the stock sample 
are zero throughout. 
In Appendix D.4 the corresponding estimates for the long term compliance are given. The results 
are similar for Definitions 1 and 2, with the negative effect in Basel now only being marginally 
significant at the 10% level in one of the two variants considered. Some evidence for a negative 
effect in St.Gallen appears as well. The two additional definitions of long term compliance (Defi 
nition 3 and 4) examined in Appendix D.4 show some indications of a positive effect in Zürich, 
which is not very stable, though. Given that we observe no significant effect for Definitions 1 and 
2, this result has to be interpreted with care as Definition 3 may be afflicted by some selection bias 
(see Appendix D.3 for details on defining compliance). For the other regions, all effects are insig 
nificant. 
                                                           
16  This is because there are no always treated, in the language of Imbens and Angrist (1994).   20 
Table 3: Impact of downloading predictions on short-term compliance 
Definition  All  Basel  Bern  St.Gallen  Zürich 
Stock sample, with control variables 
1  0.00  -0.01  0.01  0.00  0.03 
2  0.00  -0.02  0.03  -0.04  0.02 
Flow sample, with control variables 
1  -0.02  -0.11  0.02  -0.05  0.00 
2  -0.05  0.03  -0.02  -0.16  -0.04 
Stock sample, without control variables 
1  0.00  -0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.02 
2  0.00  -0.01  0.02  -0.07  0.02 
Flow sample, without control variables 
1  -0.03  -0.15**  0.01  -0.03  0.01 
2  -0.05  -0.01  -0.02  -0.11  -0.03 
Note:   Instrumental variable estimates of the effect of downloading the predictions on compliance, where compliance is measured in the short 
term, i.e. within 90 days. (Geneva is not included since predictions were hardly ever downloaded.) Standard errors are clustered by 
caseworkers. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is marked with ***, ** and *, respectively. The following characteristics of the 
jobseeker are used as control variables: female, age, foreigner with yearly permit, foreigner with residence permit, mother tongue nei-
ther German nor French, family size, insured earnings, qualification, employability rating, looking for a part-time job, duration of unem-
ployment, unemployment spells in last two years. 
Hence,  these  results  corroborate  the  finding  that  caseworkers  did  not  adjust  their  selection  of 
ALMP to the econometric predictions provided by SAPS. In additional analyses (not shown here) 
we also examined IV estimates of downloading on the employment probabilities of the jobseekers. 
Not surprisingly, no clear and significant pattern was found. 
5  Conclusions 
A randomized experiment was conducted in Switzerland to evaluate the potential of a statistical 
targeting system to assist caseworkers in choosing active labour market programmes for their un 
employed clients. The potential employment outcomes were predicted for each unemployed per 
son based on a large administrative dataset. The experiment was designed such that caseworkers 
retained full discretion about the choice of labour market programmes for their unemployed cli 
ents. The evaluation results showed that caseworkers largely ignored the statistical support system. 
No significant differences in their choices of labour market programmes could be discerned vis à 
vis the experimental control group. Caseworkers either decided to ignore the system out of various 
reasons, or they were overly confident in their own experience and considered econometric esti 
mates as inferior. 
Profiling and targeting of ALMP is a hotly debated topic and several countries including the UK, 
Germany, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are currently piloting such systems or considering their   21 
introduction. Our evaluation results indicate that caseworker discretion may conflict with the pro 
vision of statistical targeting. It seems that stronger incentives are required for caseworkers to 
comply with statistical profiling and targeting systems. Either restrictions of caseworker discre 
tions' or positive rewards for complying with the statistical system are needed (i.e. for voluntarily 
restricting discretion). 
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Appendix 
A  Data  
For the pilot study, detailed data on previous clients was required for the estimation of the coeffi 
cients of the SAPS system. Furthermore, data was needed for the clients during the field study and 
their follow up information on assignments to ALMP and subsequent employment outcomes. 
The estimation of the SAPS system was based on the entire population of individuals (aged 25 to 
55) who registered as jobseekers at an employment office anytime during January 2001 to Decem 
ber 2003. For these 460442 persons, detailed information from the unemployment insurance in 
formation system (AVAM/ASAL) was available from January 1998 to December 2004. This data 
set was matched with the complete monthly information from the social security and pensions sys 
tem (AHV) for the period January 1990 to December 2002. These combined data sources contain 
very detailed information on registration and de registration of unemployment, benefit payments 
and sanctions, participation in ALMP, eleven years employment histories with monthly informa 
tion on earnings and employment status (employed, unemployed, non employed, self employed).   24 
Furthermore, they contain information on socioeconomic characteristics including qualification, 
education, language skills (mother tongue, proficiency of foreign languages), job position, experi 
ence, profession, industry, and an employability rating by the caseworker, among other variables. 
During the field study in 2005, the information from the unemployment insurance information 
system (AVAM/ASAL) was delivered to us biweekly for all currently registered jobseekers. 
Finally, in February/March 2007 we received the data from the unemployment insurance informa 
tion system until the end of December 2006. This permits us to follow up each participant of the 
field study for at least 12 months. 
B  Further details on the SAPS predictions 
The SAPS predictions are based on estimates of the expected potential outcomes 
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The SAPS system provided estimates of the employment chances 
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of the optimal treatment r
*, based on a rich set of covariates Xi,t, which includes characteristics of 
the unemployed person, such as age, gender, family composition, education, language skills, quali 
fications, job experience, past employment and earnings histories, previous participation in pro 
grammes etc., and of the local labour market. Several of these covariates are time varying, e.g. the 
current duration of the unemployment spell or the number of vacancies in the local labour market. 
For the estimation of the system, an even larger set of covariates was taken into account to elimi 
nate potential selection bias, see Frölich (2008). Since selection bias may be more of a concern for 
the young and the older individuals, the SAPS system is restricted in this pilot version to the 25 to 
55 year old jobseekers. (For the younger jobseekers, detailed and long employment histories are 
often not yet available. For the older jobseekers good health data would be helpful e.g. to assess 
their labour market attachment or early retirement options.)  
In addition to these estimates of expected employment chances, the SAPS system also provides 
estimates of statistical precision, which are conveyed to the caseworker in a simple and accessible   25 
way. Using Multiple Comparison with the Best procedures (MCB), the available programmes are 
separated into three categories: 'good', 'intermediate', and 'bad' treatments. The information pro 
vided to the caseworker to assist the treatment choice for jobseeker i is in the following form and 
was made accessible via an Internet application developed for the field study: 
Table B.1: Example of individual SAPS predictions 
Expected number of months in stable employment in the following 12 months 
for individual i if initiating a labour market programme now or soon: 
No programme  6.7 
Job search and personality courses  2.7 
Language skills training  4.1 
Computer skills training  6.1 
Further training  5.7 
Employment programmes  3.0 
 
Programmes that are statistically significantly better than the others are marked as bold under-
lined, whereas intermediate programmes are marked in bold and the worst programmes are not 
marked. (In the pilot study, the best programmes were marked on the screen in green and the worst 
in red.) Caseworkers were advised to choose a programme out of the set of statistically best pro-
grammes, with a slight preference to be given to the programme with the highest estimated em 
ployment chances. In the example above, the set of best programmes contained the options "no 
programme" and "computer skills training". 
Generally, the cardinality of this set depends on the covariates Xi,t. For some jobseekers, there was 
only one statistically significantly best programme, whereas for others the set of best programmes 
might contain three or four, or even all programmes.
17 This was intended to show the caseworker 
that the information that the statistical system can provide varies across jobseekers and that the 
caseworker should trust the SAPS predictions more if they were very precise and consider other 
considerations when they were very imprecise. 
C  Labour market programmes in Switzerland 
Many different programmes are available in Switzerland (and these programmes might vary some 
what from region to region). The official classification distinguishes 43 different types, of which 
                                                           
17  The confidence level for the statistical inference was also randomized across caseworkers but this did not seem to 
affect their behaviour at all.   26 
most are training or employment programmes. For various reasons explained below these pro 
grammes were grouped into a few broader categories. The exact definition of the groups varied 
slightly from region to region and the following discussion focuses on Basel city. For the region 
Basel the ALMP are categorized into six (R+1=6) different groups: 
Table C.1: Labour market programmes in Basel 
No programme 
Job search and personality courses 
Language skills training 




The first category 'No programme' means that the jobseeker is not allocated to any ALMP in this 
month, but leaving the option for the future, if still unemployed then. This category could therefore 
also be labelled as 'waiting' or 'no programme now but perhaps later'. This has to be distinguished 
from a treatment 'no programme at all' or 'no programme for the next 12 months' or 'no programme 
for the entire unemployment spell'. Such a programme does not exist in the above list out of two 
reasons: First, forgoing the option to choose a labour market programme later is not really a sensi 
ble choice for a caseworker. The caseworker meets the jobseeker about once a month and decides 
about actions to be taken then. Sequential plans may be developed but at every meeting, the latest 
information and events are incorporated to update such plans. Second, identifying the effect of a 
treatment 'no programme for the next 12 months' is more difficult than for a treatment 'no pro 
gramme now but perhaps later' because of the dynamic nature of the job search. When examining 
previous participants in 'no programme for the next 12 months', many of them had been lucky 
enough to find a job before a programme had been assigned. Hence, this group may contain a lar 
ger proportion of good risks or individuals successful in the job search. For further discussion, see 
Fredriksson and Johansson (2003). 
The categories two to six contain active programmes.
18 The second category consists of a variety 
of often short, basic courses, including training in effective job search strategies and resume writ 
                                                           
18  Only courses of at least five days duration are included. Shorter courses are included in the no programme category. 
Such may be short evening courses that provide information on the duties and rights of unemployed or language 
proficiency tests for assessing the need for a language course or its appropriate level.   27 
ing and more intensive personality courses, which provide psychological backing for handling the 
shock of becoming unemployed and coaching in developing new perspectives to entering the la 
bour market. These courses may be tailored to different groups (manual workers, management) 
and offered in different languages. 
The third category contains language and communication skills training for foreigners (including 
alphabetization courses, basic skills in dealing with Swiss administrations and vocational language 
courses for low educated foreigners)
19 as well as courses in foreign languages at different levels. 
Category 4, computer training, refers mostly to general courses in office applications such as word 
processing and spreadsheet calculations, but also stock keeping and order management software. 
The fifth category consists of further training in the jobseeker's occupation. Its duration is usually 
between one week and two months. (Re training to a new profession is not offered by Swiss 
ALMP.) 
The sixth category consists of subsidized employment programmes or job creation schemes in a 
sheltered labour market, usually of three to six months duration. This includes activities in can 
tonal  and  municipal  administrations  (including  hospitals,  kindergartens,  schools,  and  nursing 
homes) and non regular workplaces in charitable, cultural, recycling, environmental protection or 
other non profit organizations. Internships are also included in this category. 
Given the large number of active labour market programmes available in Switzerland the above 
grouping into only 5 broad categories may appear rather rough. There are several reasons for not 
choosing very narrow categories, though. One reason is statistical precision in that the number of 
observations available in the dataset would be very small for some courses. However, there are 
also more substantial issues. First, all of the R available categories should make sense for every 
jobseeker. If one of the categories was defined as a language course for foreigners, it would not be 
a reasonable option for a Swiss jobseeker and no predictions should be made because such a pro 
gramme would be dismissed from the outset. The choice set {0, ..., 5} would thus depend on the 
characteristics Xit and would have to be treated as a function of Xit, which would complicate the 
implementation. By defining a category language skills training which includes German, French 
and foreign language courses, this category becomes feasible for every jobseeker, and the Xit char 
acteristics (e.g. mother tongue, profession) define which type of language course or further train 
ing is appropriate. 
                                                           
19  Learning occupation specific vocabulary e.g. in the construction or hotel and restaurant industry.   28 
A second reason is that the caseworker may actually have much better information for choosing 
the exact course out of a broader category. The statistical system may be able to estimate how 
much the labour market values different types of training, but cannot recommend whether an ad 
vanced or intermediate English course would be more appropriate. The caseworker may also know 
better about local waiting lists or supply constraints that are to be taken into account when allocat 
ing a course. 
Third, in the pilot study employment predictions are made for the year 2005/06 based on data on 
participants of the years 2001 to 2003. During these years, some of these courses have been modi 
fied and providers have changed in several details. However, the broader structure of these pro 
grammes remained largely unchanged. Therefore, we do not want to define categories too nar 
rowly, as specific courses may be rather different today.
20 
D  Evaluation of the field study 
D.1  Sample 
In this appendix additional material about the evaluation of the experiment is given. The following 
table shows the number of treated and control jobseekers in the five regions. 
Table D.1: Sample sizes 
  Stock sample  Flow sample 
  22758  12632 
  treatment  control  treatment  control 
All  12079  10679  6634  5998 
All without Geneva  10401  9472  6165  5505 
Basel  2404  2368  1158  1202 
Bern  5501  4805  3474  3004 
Geneva  1678  1207  469  493 
St.Gallen  1078  960  757  549 
Zürich  1418  1339  776  750 
Note:   Number of treated and control jobseekers in the five regions. The first row refers to the entire sample. The second row refers to all 
regions except Geneva. 
                                                           
20  The above categories contain only programmes that a caseworker can actively assign. The Swiss labour market 
policy also provides a few other instruments, such as subsidies for temporary jobs (interim jobs), regular jobs (set 
tling in allowances), and self employment assistance. These are not included in the statistical system since the for 
mer are largely contingent upon that a job has already been found (and thus cannot be assigned directly by the 
caseworker) and since the occurrence of self employment assistance is relatively rare and the selection problem 
more difficult to handle.   29 
A jobseeker is defined as treated or control according to the treatment status of his first caseworker 
during the field study. For some jobseekers, a change in their caseworker happened, where the new 
caseworker might have a different treatment status. The occurrence of such a switching is exam 
ined in the following table. Examining the stock sample, one can see that for about 800 of the 
treated and control jobseekers their treatment status changes over time. Of those jobseekers whose 
caseworkers were in the treatment group at the beginning of the field study, 238 moved to a case 
worker of the control group and 556 moved to a caseworker who belongs neither to the SAPS 
treatment nor to the control group.
21 These jobseekers started as being treated but then received no 
predictions anymore. (A treatment effect of SAPS might thus be diminished for this group.) Note 
that there are only 16 cases changing treatment status more than once over time. For those job 
seekers who started being in the control group, 448 moved to a caseworker who belonged neither 
to the treatment nor to the control group. For these jobseekers, predictions never became available. 
The only group that could raise concern are those 345 observations who started as controls and 
ended up in the treatment group. These could bias a treatment effect downward. Nevertheless, they 
represent only about 3% of the controls.
22 For the flow sample, these figures are lower since a 
caseworker change usually takes place only after several months of unsuccessful job search at 
tempts. Overall, the numbers of switchers are not very large to expect large impacts on estimated 
treatment effects. In fact, in the main analyses most estimates turn out to be very similar with and 
without switchers. 
                                                           
21  These caseworkers did not participate in the randomization or started working for the employment office after the 
randomization. 
22  There is also a group of jobseekers who started as being neither treated nor control and entered later into the treat 
ment or control group. These, however, are eliminated from the sample.   30 
Table D.2: Change in treatment status over time 
  Stock sample  Flow sample 
  Treatment status according to the time-invariant definition 
         
  treatment  control  treatment  control 
  22758  12632 
All  12079  10679  6634  5998 
Time constant  11269  9875  6276  5707 
Switchers     810 (6.7%)  804 (7.5%)  358 (5.4%)  291 (4.9%) 
         
into treatment     345    143 
into control  238    149   
to other  556  448  205  145 
several changes  16  11  4  3 
Note:   Stock and flow sample defined according to the time-invariant definition, where treatment status of the jobseeker is defined by the treatment status of 
his first caseworker. 
In some additional analyses (not shown here), we also examined the switchers in more detail. The 
occurrence of caseworker changes was more frequent in Geneva and in St.Gallen (where there was 
substantial staff turnover during the field study). Caseworker changes happened less frequently in 
Basel, Bern, and Zürich. An analysis of the individual characteristics of the jobseekers showed that 
the switchers had poorer labour market chances than the non switchers. Nevertheless, those who 
switched into treatment had similar characteristics as those who switched into control. Similarly, 
those who switched out of treatment also had similar characteristics to those who switched out of 
control. Hence, there does not seem to be a systematic difference between the switchers. One 
could have been concerned that employment office managers might have allocated jobseekers, for 
whom a caseworker change was due, selectively into the treatment or control group. However, this 
is not supported by the data. Hence, leaving out the switchers from the analysis should lead to less 
contaminated impact estimates without introducing selection bias. 
D.2  Download of SAPS predictions 
The 142 caseworkers in the treatment group could download the SAPS predictions anytime for any 
of their clients. Twenty one caseworkers never used this option at all. The following discussion 
provides some information on the frequency of downloading the SAPS predictions. 
Overall, for about 37% of all jobseekers in the treatment group their SAPS predictions were exam 
ined at least once. Hence, for nearly two thirds they were never inspected. For the 142 casework 
ers the following table shows for how many of their clients the SAPS predictions were viewed at 
least once. The average (median) caseworker counselled during the entire field study a total num 
ber of 163 jobseekers. The total number of cases per caseworker varied from a minimum of 8 to a   31 
maximum of 283 clients. This variation is partly due to different caseloads but also due to different 
lengths of the field study, which did not start in all offices at the same time and ended earlier for 
those caseworkers who retired. It is also due to different labour market conditions, e.g. the pace of 
job  turnover.  The  average  caseworker  downloaded  SAPS  predictions  for  51  different  clients, 
whereas the most active caseworker examined predictions for 174 clients. The average caseworker 
examined the SAPS predictions for 33% of his clients, with the most active caseworker even view 
ing the predictions for 83% of his clients. The frequency of downloading the predictions was larg 
est in St.Gallen and Zürich. In Geneva, on the other hand, the SAPS predictions were downloaded 
on average for less than 1% of all clients (not shown). In other words, SAPS was almost com 
pletely ignored in Geneva. 
Table D.3: Frequency of download of SAPS predictions per caseworker (all regions without Geneva) 
  25% 
quantile  Median  75% 
quantile  Minimum  Maxi-
mum 
           
Number of jobseekers for whom predictions were downloaded  8  51  78  0  174 
Total number of jobseekers during field study  129  163  188  8  283 
Fraction of jobseekers for whom predictions were downloaded  0.08  0.33  0.57  0  0.83 
                          in Basel  0.09  0.40  0.56  0  0.81 
                          in Bern  0.13  0.37  0.56  0  0.83 
                          in Geneva  0.00  0.00  0.01  0  0.25 
                          in St.Gallen  0.17  0.54  0.62  0.02  0.72 
                          in Zürich  0.18  0.51  0.67  0  0.79 
Note:   142 caseworkers. All rows (except the row labelled Geneva) are without Geneva. For each variable in column 1 the 0.25, median and 
0.75 quantile and the minimum and maximum over the 142 caseworkers (without those in Geneva) is given. 
In the Tables D.4 and D.5, we examine whether the probability of downloading the predictions 
depends on the jobseeker characteristics and/or on the caseworker characteristics. Table D.4 shows 
the probit regression of download on several jobseeker characteristics. The estimation results for 
Geneva  should  be  interpreted  with  caution  since  the  SAPS  predictions  were  hardly  ever 
downloaded. The main pattern observed is a higher likelihood of examining SAPS predictions for 
those who had been more unemployed in the last two years, and a lower likelihood for those job 
seekers in the flow sample. The latter may be due to a somewhat declining interest on the side of 
the caseworkers during the pilot study.    32 
Table D.4: Probability of download as a function of jobseeker characteristics 
Dependent variable  With switch-
ers  Without switchers 
Download of prediction  All without 
Geneva 
All without 
Geneva  Basel  Bern  Geneva  St.Gallen  Zürich 
               
Female jobseeker  -0.036  -0.036  0.031  -0.15***  0.158  0.059  0.17* 
Age/100  0.257  0.288  1.542  -0.96  6.087*  3.68**  0.66 
Age/100 squared  0.31  0.329  -1.41  1.9  -7.501*  -4.325**  -0.03 
Foreigner with yearly permit (B)  -0.055  -0.045  0.06  -0.14**  -0.331***  -0.007  0.08 
Foreigner with residence permit (C)  -0.008  -0.015  0.013  -0.05  -0.241***  0.028  -0.05 
Qualification (reference: apprenticeship/degree)               
No qualification  -0.035  -0.036  0.043  -0.1  -0.538**  -0.015  0.15 
Short apprenticeship  0.126**  0.127**  -0.08  0.09  -0.304*  0.007  0.26* 
Apprenticeship or degree that is not officially 
recognized in Switzerland  -0.002  -0.01  -0.09  0.01  -0.071  0.126  0.07 
Employability medium  0.129  0.148  0.067  0.19  -0.467**  0.668***  0.08 
Employability difficult  0.1  0.11  0.215  0.18  -0.256*  0.381*  0.08 
Looking for part-time job  -0.122***  -0.133***  -0.1  -0.14**  -0.352  -0.096  0.05 
Current duration of unemployment  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00**  0.00  0.001***  -0.00** 
Number of unemployment spells in last 2 years  0.209***  0.224***  0.328***  0.16***  0.189  0.531**  0.25* 
In flow sample  -0.48***  -0.475***  -0.62***  -0.45***  -0.514***  -0.4***  -0.42*** 
Constant  -0.325*  -0.348*  -0.64*  -0.18  -2.275**  -1.382***  -0.22 
N  16563  15699  3528  8482  1843  1578  2111 
Note:   Probit regression. All jobseekers of the treatment group (without Geneva). Dependent variable: whether, for the particular jobseeker, 
SAPS predictions have been downloaded at least once. Standard errors are clustered by caseworkers. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level is marked with ***, ** and *, respectively. 
Table D.5 includes also caseworker characteristics additionally in the regression. The caseworker 
characteristics are mostly insignificant and their coefficients do not display a clear pattern across 
regions. For the jobseeker characteristics it again appears that the number of unemployment spells 
and the current duration of unemployment has a positive effect on the download probability. The 
negative coefficient for the flow sample remains. The variable 'short apprenticeship' (=Anlehre) is 
positively significant in both tables. In Switzerland, a 'short apprenticeship' is of two years dura 
tion with reduced skill requirements, and is distinct from a 'regular apprenticeship' which is of 
three years duration and more demanding. Jobseekers with a 'short apprenticeship' are thus not 
unqualified but signal a clear qualification gap, which could perhaps partly be filled with ALMP. 
Overall, the occurrence of a download of the SAPS prediction depended more on the jobseeker 
characteristics than those of the caseworker, but the overall patterns are not very strong.   33 
Table D.5: Probability of download as a function of jobseeker and caseworker characteristics 
Dependent variable  with 
switchers  without switchers 







Basel  Bern  St.Gallen  Zürich 
Jobseeker characteristics             
Female jobseeker  -0.021  -0.019  0.043  -0.089*  0.1*  0.101 
Age/100  0.408  0.444  1.262  -0.908  4.362**  1.803 
Age/100 squared  0.131  0.145  -1.146  1.857  -5.13*  -1.443 
Foreigner with yearly permit (B)  -0.05  -0.041  0.075  -0.123**  -0.028  0.035 
Foreigner with residence permit (C)  -0.009  -0.017  0.013  -0.061  0.064  -0.046 
Qualification (reference: apprenticeship/degree)             
No qualification  -0.038  -0.044  0.074*  -0.125*  0.017  0.148** 
Short apprenticeship  0.128**  0.129**  -0.027  0.084  -0.181  0.233* 
Apprenticeship or degree that is not officially 
recognized in Switzerland  -0.001  -0.009  -0.101  0.029  0.071  0.009 
Employability medium  0.127  0.146  0.037  0.177  0.407***  -0.033 
Employability difficult  0.071  0.081  0.126  0.123  0.391  0.144 
Looking for part-time job  -0.118***  -0.128***  -0.089  -0.097**  -0.288*  0.006 
Current duration of unemployment in days  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.001**  0.001**  -0.001*** 
Number of unemployment spells in last 2 years  0.215***  0.229***  0.303***  0.174***  0.561**  0.271** 
In flow sample  -0.48***  -0.474***  -0.65***  -0.46***  -0.421***  -0.485*** 
             
Caseworker characteristics             
Female caseworker  -0.206  -0.201  -0.317  -0.415**  0.644*  0.582* 
Age:  25 to 40 years  -0.135  -0.079  -0.303  0.117  -0.61***  0.09 
  41 to 46 years  0.118  0.12  -0.17  0.17  -1.579***  0.305 
  46 to 56 years  0.271  0.325*  0.367  0.11  -0.262  0.931** 
  age missing  0.114  0.099  -0.294  0.043  0.151  n/a 
Constant  -0.357*  -0.4*  -0.334  -0.101  -1.102***  -0.983* 
N  16563  15698  3528  8481  1578  2110 
Note:   Probit regression. All jobseekers of the treatment group (without Geneva). Dependent variable: whether, for the particular jobseeker, 
SAPS predictions have been downloaded at least once. Standard errors are clustered by caseworkers. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level is marked with ***, ** and *, respectively. 
In additional analysis (not shown here), we also examined to which extent the dynamic nature of 
the predictions was used: the predictions were updated every two weeks for every jobseeker still 
registered. Hence, caseworkers should inspect the predictions repeatedly for the same client, ide 
ally before every counselling meeting. Overall, it is observed that the frequency of downloading 
slowly declined during the field study and that not much use was made of the regular updating of 
the SAPS predictions. 
D.3  Long-term compliance with the SAPS predictions 
In Table 2, we observed that the incidence of “compliance” with the SAPS predictions was almost   34 
identical in the treatment and the control group. Compliance was defined if SAPS predictions and 
actual treatment choice coincided within the subsequent 90 days. In the following, we consider 
alternative definitions of compliance, which nevertheless all lead to the same conclusion that dif 
ferences in compliance between treated and control are (close to) zero. 
In the following definitions of compliance, again the first SAPS prediction is examined and com 
pared to the actual assignment to ALMP, where the entire period after the SAPS prediction until 
December 2006 is considered. In addition, the first three assigned ALMP are examined.
23 Hence, a 
caseworker who assigned first a non recommended ALMP but afterwards as a second (or third) 
ALMP also a recommended programme would be considered as complying, even if the second or 
third programme was assigned only many months later. Hence, we permit a delayed compliance in 
that a caseworker might have initiated a different programme first with the option to consider the 
SAPS suggestions later. This thus captures the long-term effect of the SAPS predictions on the 
choice of ALMP. 
The following table shows the results for 8 different definitions. To structure these different defini 
tions we distinguish between 4 definitions and 2 versions. The 2 versions differ in how they define 
when a jobseeker has realized the option “no programme”. 
In Version A a jobseeker is considered to have received “no programme” if he was not assigned to 
any ALMP at all until the end of our observation period in December 2006. (If he was assigned to 
at least one ALMP, he is considered to have not received “no programme”.) In Version B a job 
seeker is considered to have received “no programme” if he was assigned to at most two ALMP 
until the end of our observation period in December 2006. I.e. he is considered to have received 
“no programme” in addition to the other ALMP that he participated in. If he was assigned to three 
or more ALMP, he is considered to have not received “no programme”. In other words, “no pro 
gramme” in Version A means no ALMP at all, whereas in Version B it means at most two ALMP, 
but not more. 
The four different definitions differ in how they define whether SAPS predictions and actual allo 
                                                           
23 Only ALMP after the first SAPS prediction are considered. For the stock sample, this corresponds with the start of 
the field study. For a jobseeker of the flow sample, this corresponds to the first date of uploading predictions for 
this individual. We focus on the first SAPS prediction being made, because compliance with later predictions are 
harder to measure as there might be a delayed effect from previous predictions. In addition, the caseworkers’ inter 
est and attention seems to have been highest in the early phase of the field study.   35 
cations coincided. In Definition 1 compliance is defined if the programme with the highest SAPS 
predictions coincided with any of the first three assigned programmes (including the “no pro 
gramme” option). In Definition 2 compliance is defined if any of the programmes that are in the 
MCB set of best programmes coincided with any of the first three assigned programmes (including 
the “no programme” option).
24 Although this definition of compliance is extremely wide, it was 
satisfied only for 29% (Version A) or 35% (Version B) of all jobseekers, as Table D.6 shows. Ex 
amining the results for treated and control we observe no systematic difference in compliance 
rates. If any difference is discernible at all, it even points towards slightly less compliance of the 
treated caseworkers. As before, the only exception is Geneva. Since SAPS predictions were hardly 
ever downloaded in Geneva, this difference can only be the result of randomization not having 
been successful in Geneva in that it did not lead to a balanced control group. (The compliance 
rates for Basel are much higher than for the other regions, which is at least partly due to the 
smaller number of ALMP categories in Basel, which were only 6 for Basel and 7 for the other re 
gions, including the no participation option.) 
Before concluding that no compliance difference exists, we examined two additional definitions of 
compliance. One could imagine that our findings might have to do with the fact that we treated the 
"no programme" option just as another treatment option in the SAPS predictions. However, it 
could well be that caseworkers consider this option as something very different from an active 
choice of an ALMP. 
First, one could imagine that caseworkers first decide (i.e. without consulting SAPS) whether us 
ing ALMP or not is most appropriate for a particular client. Only if they conclude that an ALMP 
should be assigned, they might wish to examine the SAPS predictions. In this case, we would like 
to measure compliance only in the second step of this two stage decision process. We therefore 
consider as compliance if the jobseeker was assigned to the programme with the largest SAPS 
prediction, given that an ALMP was assigned (Definition 3). In other words, for Definition 3 all 
jobseekers who never received any ALMP are deleted, and for the remaining jobseekers, we apply 
Definition 1: Compliance is defined if the programme with the highest SAPS prediction coincided 
                                                           
24  Note that, for Version B, these definitions include the case of short term compliance as discussed in Table 2. Ver 
sion A of long term compliance, however, is neither strictly weaker nor stronger than short term compliance. It is 
weaker in the sense that long term compliance considers the first three programmes assigned. It is stricter in the 
sense that “no programme” requires no ALMP until the end of 2006, whereas short term compliance only requires 
no ALMP for the subsequent 90 days.   36 
with any of the first three assigned programmes (not including the “no programme” option). 
The results are shown in Table D.6. (Because the definition is the same for Version A and B, no 
numbers for Version B Definition 3 are given.) The note below Table D.6 gives the number of 
observations who are not deleted for Definition 3, which are roughly a third of the total sample. If 
the decision to assign any ALMP at all or not was already influenced by SAPS or related to some 
unobserved characteristics, this could be a selected sample and might incorporate some selection 
bias. Again, there seems to be no difference between treatment and control group, perhaps with the 
exception of Zürich, where compliance according to this definition was higher for the treated than 
for the compliers. 
For the second alternative definition (Definition 4), one could imagine that caseworkers may have 
considered the SAPS predictions as too much tilted towards active ALMP. Therefore, caseworkers 
may have followed the SAPS predictions in general but preferred to choose the “no programme” 
option more often. (The target variable of the SAPS project ignored programme costs entirely and 
due to its focus on stable employment, penalized short job spells; both aspects could have been at 
odds with the preferences of (some of) the caseworkers.)  
In Definition 4, we do not eliminate those cases where no ALMP has been chosen but consider 
instead the "no programme" option to be always among the set of best options. Hence, we artifi 
cially augment the MCB set of best programme with the "no programme" option. Compliance is 
then defined, analogously to Definition 2, if the jobseeker was assigned to a programme out of the 
set of significantly best programmes including "no programme" (Definition 4).
25 
As Table D.6 shows, there is again no systematic difference in compliance rates between treated 
and control. Only in Zürich a small difference can be observed, which is not significant. (The 
overall much higher compliance rate of about 80% is due to the artificial augmentation with the no 
programme option, since many jobseekers did not receive any ALMP at all.) 
Hence, whichever definition we look at, the conclusion is always nearly the same. Only in Zürich 
a (insignificant) difference can be observed for Definitions 3 and 4, but none for the, more plausi 
ble, Definitions 1 and 2. For the other regions, no differences are discerned and sometimes it ap 
                                                           
25  More precisely, compliance according to Version A is defined if either never an ALMP has been assigned or if any 
of the first three assigned ALMP coincided with the MCB set of best programmes. Version B is complied with if ei 
ther Version A is satisfied or if less than three ALMP have been assigned until December 2006 and “no pro 
gramme” belonged to the MCB set of best programmes according to the SAPS predictions.   37 
pears even as if there is less compliance among treated than controls. Table D.6 thus suggests that 
the availability of the SAPS predictions seems to have been ignored almost completely by the 
caseworkers, at least in the sense that their choices of ALMP are not significantly different from 
those of the control group. 
Table D.6: Long-term compliance of caseworkers in their choice of ALMP 








only if an ALMP 
was assigned 
(Definition 3) 
Set of highest 
predictions includ-




ment  Control  Treat 
ment  Control  Treat-
ment  Control  Treat-
ment  Control 
Including switchers  0.12  0.13  0.29  0.29  0.27  0.26  0.75  0.74 
Without switchers  0.13  0.13  0.29  0.29  0.27  0.26  0.75  0.74 
Stock sample  0.12  0.12  0.30  0.30  0.29  0.29  0.78  0.77 
Flow sample  0.13  0.14  0.28  0.28  0.23  0.23  0.71  0.71 
Basel  0.19  0.19  0.41  0.41  0.28  0.30  0.77  0.77 
Bern  0.10  0.10  0.27  0.26  0.25  0.25  0.74  0.73 
Geneva  0.11  0.15  0.23  0.26  0.39  0.44  0.78  0.74 
St.Gallen  0.12  0.13  0.25  0.27  0.26  0.26  0.72  0.70 
Zürich  0.10  0.10  0.22  0.21  0.34  0.27  0.80  0.78 








only if an ALMP 
was assigned 
(Definition 3) 
Set of highest 
predictions includ-




ment  Control  Treat 
ment  Control      Treat-
ment  Control 
Including switchers  0.16  0.17  0.35  0.36  0.81  0.80 
Without switchers  0.16  0.17  0.35  0.36  0.81  0.81 
Stock sample  0.15  0.15  0.35  0.36  0.84  0.83 
Flow sample  0.18  0.19  0.35  0.36 
same as above 
0.78  0.78 
Basel  0.25  0.27  0.51  0.52      0.87  0.87 
Bern  0.14  0.13  0.32  0.32      0.80  0.79 
Geneva  0.11  0.16  0.25  0.28      0.80  0.76 
St.Gallen  0.16  0.18  0.30  0.34      0.76  0.77 
Zürich  0.12  0.11  0.25  0.23      0.83  0.80 
Note:   Unit of observation is the jobseeker. All rows (except the row labelled Geneva) are without Geneva. All rows (except for the first one) 
are without switchers. The number of observations for Definition 3 is 5689 in the treatment and 5333 in the control group. Without 
switchers, these are 5293 and 4929. In stock sample: 3075 and 2978. In flow sample: 2218 and 2021. In Basel, Bern, Geneva, 
St.Gallen and Zürich these numbers are 1110 and 1176, 2960 and 2653, 679 and 568, 599 and 510, 624 and 590, respectively.   38 
Table D.7: Recommended and realized treatment choices 
  First SAPS prediction  Allocated programme after start of pilot study 
  Highest prediction  First programme  First three pro-
grammes 
  treatment  control  treatment  control  treatment  control 
Basel 
Number of observations  3528  3514  3528  3514  3528  3514 
No ALMP  21.15  22.65  68.54  66.53  97.93  97.84 
Basic courses (job search training, personality course)  11.45  12.07  10.12  12.81  10.23  12.86 
Language course  9.47  9.36  3.26  3.22  3.74  3.84 
Computer course  15.31  14.88  2.98  2.25  3.49  3.02 
Further training  27.52  26.07  2.27  1.79  2.98  2.45 
Employment programme  15.11  14.97  6.15  6.63  8.62  9.68 
Other courses      6.69  6.77  8.76  8.48 
 
Bern 
Number of observations  8484  7458  8484  7458  8484  7458 
No ALMP  10.25  9.76  65.10  64.43  95.95  95.64 
Basic courses (job search training, personality course)  1.98  1.78  10.58  10.53  10.89  10.78 
Language course  12.28  12.24  5.32  5.36  6.22  6.30 
Computer course  19.10  20.10  2.25  2.16  3.22  3.24 
Further training  21.60  21.47  2.85  2.70  4.14  3.96 
Employment programme (individual) / internship  28.58  27.25  2.31  2.44  3.14  3.35 
Employment programme (collective) / training firm  6.20  7.40  4.96  4.83  7.44  6.74 
Other courses      6.62  7.56  8.99  9.90 
 
St.Gallen 
Number of observations  1578  1250  1578  1250  1578  1250 
No ALMP  11.91  12.24  62.04  59.20  94.74  94.24 
Basic courses (job search training)  6.34  5.92  11.09  9.28  11.22  9.44 
Personality course  16.98  14.56  6.65  9.12  9.38  11.68 
Language course  24.40  25.36  3.80  5.28  6.08  6.80 
Computer course   7.22  8.16  2.66  2.96  4.82  4.88 
Further training  30.42  30.96  0.32  0.40  0.51  1.12 
Employment programme  2.72  2.80  8.87  9.36  13.94  15.28 
Other courses      4.56  4.40  6.65  6.56 
 
Zürich 
Number of observations  2111  1933  2111  1933  2111  1933 
No ALMP  7.58  6.67  70.44  69.48  98.20  98.86 
Basic courses (job search training)  7.67  6.41  15.11  15.26  15.11  15.26 
Personality course  8.15  6.83  1.71  1.66  2.42  2.43 
Language course  31.83  32.44  4.55  4.50  5.73  5.69 
Computer course   12.08  15.73  1.71  1.60  2.65  2.38 
Further training  16.96  16.14  0.90  0.57  1.18  0.72 
Employment programme  15.73  15.78  4.50  4.86  6.73  7.09 
Other courses      1.09  2.07  1.56  2.53 
Note:  All jobseekers, without switchers, without Geneva. 
Table D.7 compares the patterns of ALMP that were recommended by SAPS with those actually   39 
assigned in the treatment and control group. It shows, first, that there were no systematic differ 
ences between treated and control, and, second, that the SAPS recommendations were clearly dif 
ferent from those actually realized. Hence, the potential argument that the reason for why we did 
not observe any effect on the pilot study being the coincidence of the caseworkers’ own predic 
tions with those of SAPS is not supported.  
D.4  IV estimates of long-term compliance with the SAPS predictions 
Tables D.8 and D.9 provide the instrumental variable estimates for long term compliance, and thus 
complements Table 3 which showed the corresponding results for short term compliance. 
Table D.8: Impact of downloading predictions on long-term compliance (Version A) 
Definition  All  Basel  Bern  St.Gallen  Zürich 
Stock sample, with control variables 
1  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.02 
2  0.00  0.00  0.02  -0.02  0.02 
3  0.02  -0.06  0.03  0.02  0.10** 
4  0.03*  0.01  0.04  0.03  0.05 
Flow sample, with control variables 
1  -0.02  -0.01  0.01  -0.09  0.01 
2  0.00  0.11  0.01  -0.09  0.01 
3  0.00  -0.03  -0.04  -0.03  0.18 
4  0.02  0.08  -0.03  0.06  0.11** 
Stock sample, without control variables 
1  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01 
2  0.00  0.00  0.02  -0.04  0.02 
3  0.02  -0.06  0.04  0.03  0.10** 
4  0.04*  0.01  0.05  0.03  0.06* 
Flow sample, without control variables 
1  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02  -0.08  0.01 
2  0.00  0.10  0.00  -0.05  0.02 
3  0.01  0.00  -0.03  0.00  0.18 
4  0.01  0.08  -0.03  0.08  0.07 
Note:   Instrumental variable estimates of the effect of downloading the predictions on compliance, where compliance is measured in the long 
term (Version A). (Geneva is not included since predictions were hardly ever downloaded.) Standard errors are clustered by casework-
ers. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is marked with ***, ** and *, respectively.   40 
Table D.9: Impact of downloading predictions on long-term compliance (Version B) 
Definition  All  Basel  Bern  St.Gallen  Zürich 
Stock sample, with control variables 
1  0.00  -0.02  0.01  -0.01  0.03 
2  -0.01  -0.02  0.02  -0.07  0.03 
3  0.02  -0.06  0.03  0.02  0.10** 
4  0.02  -0.01  0.04*  -0.03  0.05 
Flow sample, with control variables 
1  -0.05  -0.14*  0.00  -0.14**  0.02 
2  -0.03  0.04  0.01  -0.19  0.02 
3  0.01  0.00  -0.04  -0.05  0.18 
4  -0.02  0.01  -0.03  -0.04  0.09 
Stock sample, without control variables 
1  0.00  -0.02  0.01  -0.03  0.02 
2  -0.01  -0.02  0.02  -0.11  0.02 
3  0.02  -0.06  0.04  0.03  0.10** 
4  0.03  0.00  0.05**  -0.04  0.06 
Flow sample, without control variables 
1  -0.04  -0.16*  0.00  -0.09  0.04 
2  -0.02  0.01  0.01  -0.13  0.04 
3  0.01  0.00  -0.03  0.00  0.18 
4  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.09 
Note:   Instrumental variable estimates of the effect of downloading the predictions on compliance, where compliance is measured in the long 
term (Version B). (Geneva is not included since predictions were hardly ever downloaded.) Standard errors are clustered by casework-
ers. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is marked with ***, ** and *, respectively. 